Non-Technical Summary
The major central banks pursuing Quantitative Easing (QE) have bought large volumes of public and private assets with purchases carried out in several stages. The overall balance of evidence from the literature on QE is that central bank asset purchases have had a material impact on the price of …nancial assets that have been purchased.
Studies focusing on the US government bond yields found that during the period December 2008 and March 2010, large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) by the Fed worth 10% of GDP reduced the government long-term yields by nearly 90 basis points. Equivalent amounts of BoE purchases, through the so-called Asset Purchase Facility (APF), reduced the long-term yields by just over 50 basis points between March 2009 and January 2010. It is important to note that these average estimates are partly driven by event study estimates that relate to the early stages of the crisis in 2008 and 2009, which may be less relevant in tranquil conditions. The identi…cation of the impact for the euro area associated to the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) is challenging because the monetary policy announcement on 22 January 2015 was implicitly communicated to the market in the course of the second half of 2014. Therefore, the use of traditional event studies is not clear cut. In this paper, the APP for the euro area is identi…ed using the number of references to such a programme in news stories recorded on Bloomberg, with the intuition behind this approach being that the more intense the discussion about the programme, the greater the expectation that euro area APP would be initiated.
The econometric results suggest that the ECB policy reduced the GDP-weighted 10-year euro area sovereign yields up to October 2015 by 63 basis points with the vulnerable countries bene…ting most. Most of the impact occurred between September 2014 and February 2015, in line with the view that investors discounted the implications of the monetary policy, before the actual purchases even started. The results in relation to the GDP are not very dissimilar from the estimates computed for the QE programmes in the US and the UK. Most likely, markets have looked at the experience of other central banks in order to anticipate the potential impact of APP purchases. All in all, the …ndings suggest that APP remains an important instrument to a¤ect …nancing conditions, albeit the programme was announced at a time of low …nancial distress.
Introduction
The major central banks pursuing Quantitative Easing (QE) have bought large volumes of public and private assets with purchases carried out in several stages (see Figure 1 ). In particular, the ECB on 5 March 2015 through its Asset Purchase programme (APP) announced the aim at purchasing 1. 14 It is important to note that these average estimates are partly driven by event study estimates that relate to the early stages of the crisis in 2008 and 2009, which may be less relevant in tranquil conditions. For example, asset purchases by the Fed worth 10% of GDP during LSAP2 reduced the long-term yields by about 65 basis points. And if we look at developments in US government bond yields after the announcement of LSAP3 in September 2012 and in UK government bond yields after the announcement of APF2 in November 2009, it is clear that 1 The US has carried out main three rounds of quantitative easing: LSAP1 announced on 25 November 2008, LSAP2 announced on 3 November 2010 and LSAP3 announced on 13 September 2012. The Fed has also engaged in two attempts to ‡atten the yield curve (Maturity Extension Program -MEP) by funding long maturity Treasury purchases through the sale of shorter-term Treasury securities (i.e MEP): the MEP1 was announced on 21 September 2011and the MEP 2 was announced on 20 June 2012. The UK has carried out main two rounds of MEP: MEP1 announced on 5 March 2009 and MEP2 announced on 6 October 2011. there was little reaction in sovereign yields. However, it could be argued that the impact of later rounds of purchases cannot be easily assessed if markets expected them (Martin and Milas, 2012; Cahill, et al., 2014) .
All in all, the literature on the US and UK suggest that most of the analysis has been based on event studies, which typically assume that QE announcements are unanticipated and therefore represent news to …nancial markets. One disadvantage of the event study, however, is that the e¤ect is assumed to be permanent. 2 Moreover, to the extent that QE purchases are already expected and incorporated in market prices, these methods risk underestimating the impact of QE. These di¢ culties are particularly acute in assessing later rounds of purchases, which are likely to have been anticipated by markets.
Second, it is possible that the impact of QE is state contingent and that the e¤ects diminished as a result of calmer market conditions. The identi…cation of the APP impact for the euro area is challenging because the monetary policy announcement on 22 January 2015 was implicitly communicated to the market in the course of the second half of 2014. Therefore, using traditional event studies is not clear cut.
Altavilla et al. (2015) use a traditional event study, but address this issue by considering also a series of key events associated to key ECB policy statements before the announcement. They found that the impact of the APP on the GDP-weighted 10-year euro area sovereign yields between 4 September 2014 and 5 March 2015 amounts to about 30-50 basis points. However, one disadvantage of this approach is that one could choose the most relevant dates for the analysis.
In this paper, the APP for the euro area is identi…ed using the number of references to such a programme in news stories recorded on Bloomberg, with the intuition behind this approach being that the more intense the discussion about the programme, the greater the expectation that euro area APP would be initiated. This identi…cation strategy is more agnostic, although there is a risk of weaker identi…cation as the news could capture irrelevant market rumours.
The results suggest that the news coverage increased sharply in September 2014 in line with the view that the Jackson Hole speech by Mr. Draghi on 22 August 2015 raised the expectations for the QE programme in the euro area. Moreover, we employ a panel error correction model for euro area countries'sovereign yields with fundamentals observed in real time, which permits at the APP e¤ect to decay over time.
The econometric results suggest that APP is an important instrument to a¤ect …nancing conditions and its e¤ect is persistent over time. Due to APP, the GDP-weighted 10-year euro area sovereign yield declined by 56 basis points between September 2014 and February 2015 and by additional 7 basis points between March and October 2015 suggesting that the impact was discounted by bond investors before the purchases even started. Moreover, we …nd that the impact on vulnerable countries'sovereign yields is the largest.
Given the tapered tensions in the euro area …nancial markets in 2014 and 2015, the obtained results support the view that the impact of QE on government bond yields is independent from …nancial market conditions. The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the identi…cation strategy. Section 3 brie ‡y describes the econometric method and presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Identi…cation
In the economic literature, the quanti…cation of the impact of QE policy measures on asset prices is often based on the price changes observed over a narrow time window surrounding the policy announcement. However, the identi…cation of the APP shock for the euro area is more challenging, because the monetary policy announcement on 22 January 2015, followed by the details of the new programme and the initial purchases in March 2015, was implicitly communicated to the market in the autumn 2014 and many believe that the Jackson Hole speech by Mr. Draghi on 22 August 2015 raised already such expectations, as worries about rising de ‡ationary risks coupled with negative news about the real economy were communicated. This speech is relevant against the background that, previously on 24 April 2014, Mr. Draghi stated that a worsening of the medium-term in ‡ation outlook would provide a reason for broadbased asset purchases. After the Jackson Hole speech, stocks rose, the euro fell and bond yields dropped as the comments fanned speculation the ECB was heading for further monetary stimulus. 3 This suggests that event studies based only on the o¢ cial announcement on 22 January 2015 would not be satisfactory to identify the APP shock for the euro area.
In order to estimate the incremental impact of the expected monetary policy intervention, it is necessary to look at the impact of news about the ECB asset purchases that have accumulated over time. The APP for the euro area is identi…ed using the number of references to such a programme in news stories recorded on Bloomberg, with the intuition behind this approach being that the more intense the discussion about the programme, the greater the expectation that euro area APP would be initiated. In the speci…c, the news variable is de…ned as the sum of all Bloomberg news containing jointly the following keywords: "Draghi, QE or quantitative easing, and sovereign, and euro area". Needless to say that we have tried also other alternative word combinations, such as for example the exclusion of "sovereign" or the inclusion of "ECB" together with Draghi ("Draghi "or "ECB "), but the degree of correlation between the time series is very high, even above 90 percent, and the results are not a¤ected. Governing Council meeting, there has been a renewal of news, as market participants expected -albeit timidly -the ECB to increase stimulus measures in December 2015 including APP expansion. It is very interesting to point out that APP news declined also after the Eurosystem Governing Council meeting on 05 June and 4 September 2014 (see …rst and second red and dotted vertical lines, when the two rate cuts were announced together with the longer-term re…nancing operations (TLTROs) in June and the covered bonds (CBPP3) and asset-backed securities (ABSPP) programmes in September. This suggests that the Bloomberg variable is aimed at reducing borrowing costs and increasing liquidity. See "http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-24/draghi-pushes-ecb-closer-to-qe-as-de ‡ation-risks-rise". 4 The combination of the large scale of sovereign purchase programme, the decision to set a maximum price at which the Eurosystem is willing to buy bonds and the low level of the expected net sovereign bond issuances strengthens the crowding out e¤ects of current government bond holders. It is important to notice also that on 5 March 2015 German bonds with maturities of up to three years traded below the ECB's deposit rate of -0.20% and maturities of up to seven years had negative yields.
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indeed capturing the news about the APP in the euro area and no the other monetary policy measures.
[Insert Figure 2 , here]
To be assured about the suggested identi…cation, a similar series containing jointly the following keywords: "Bernanke or Yellen, and quantitative easing, and US"has been constructed.
The correlation between the EA and the US APP news amounts to a statistically insigni…cant 12.6%.
The number of news-stories would have been very large also had the programme disappointed. This is a clear limitation to the identi…cation method. However, on the ECB press conference days, when Mario Draghi announced the APP (22 January 2015), launched the APP (5 March 2015) and surpriced markets by signalling that he was prepared to expand the APP to stave o¤ the risk of a renewed economic slowdown in the euro area (22 October 2015), all sovereign yields declined, the stock price increased, the exchange rate depreciated, suggesting that at least in these key days the news stories mainly identify positive surprises. The econometric model takes the following structure:
(2)
where Y it denote the 10-year benchmark sovereign yields in country i at time t, a i the sovereign speci…c intercept (…xed e¤ects), X it the vector of macro factors, E it the error correction mech- To study the heterogeneous response of the APP shock on bond yields among countries, we ECB Working Paper 1939, July 2016 8 also estimate the dynamic equation by interacting the APP news with the country …xed e¤ects:
The database
The 
The results
The estimation of the level equation (1) for the euro area takes the parameters reported in Table   2 . The coe¢ cients have all the correct sign and are statistically signi…cant, as deterioration in ECB Working Paper 1939, July 2016 liquidity, credit and market risks increases sovereign yields. It is important to stress that the level equation provides an equilibrium relationship between all variables and, for example, a decrease in credit and liquidity risk might not be associated with a decline in sovereign yields if the e¤ect is counterweighted by an increase in systematic risk, such a fall in expected real GDP growth or an increase in BEIR or an increase in uncertainty about the in ‡ation forecasts.
Nevertheless to appreciate the economic signi…cance of the factors, we can look at the partial elasticities, whose e¤ect is valid only all other factors being equal. Hence, ceteris paribus, an increase in bid-ask spreads by 1 basis point implies an increase in sovereign yields by 12 basis
points. An increase in government balance to GDP ratio by 1 percentage points implies a decline in sovereign yields by 15 basis points. The relationship between government debt to GDP ratio and sovereign yields is quadratic and convex. An increase in the debt to GDP ratio leads to an increase in sovereign yields after the debt to GDP ratio has reached 150%. An increase in 10-year break even in ‡ation rate by 10 basis points implies an increase in sovereign yields by 14 basis points. An increase in the 3-month OIS rate, a proxy for conventional monetary policy, by 10 basis points implies an increase in sovereign yields by 5 basis points. An increase in expected real GDP growth by 1 percentage point implies a decrease in sovereign yields by 18 basis points.
An increase in the dispersion among professional forecasters in HICP in ‡ation forecasts by 1 percentage point implies an increase in sovereign yields by 214 basis points.
[Insert Table 2 , here]
The residuals of the long run relationship are stationary based on standard panel unit root tests, regardless whether a common or individual unit root process is assumed (see Table 3 ).
The country-speci…c error correction terms are plotted in Figure 3 .
[Insert Table 3 , here]
[Insert Figure 3 , here]
In countries such as Ireland and Portugal, liquidity premia become an important issue during the sovereign debt crisis rising to unprecedented levels, most likely driven by panic and fear. Therefore, we construct also a misalignment measure by adding to the cointegrating residuals the spread between the estimated liquidity premium and its typical past value, which ECB Working Paper 1939, July 2016 is assumed to be equal to its average before the …nancial crisis started in August 2007:
. This is to say that the estimation of a sovereign yield fair value should also take into consideration a fair value for liquidity premia.
Both the estimated error correction term and the misalignment are reported in Figure 3 .
They present similar developments except for Ireland and Portugal. The misalignment registered during the hikes of the sovereign debt crisis reached 3 percentage points for Italy and Spain and 8 and 10 percentage points for Ireland and Portugal, respectively. The liquidity premium has been an issue for smaller market and clearly in Ireland and Portugal. All other sovereigns bene…ted owing to ‡ight to safety motives. All in all, these results are not inconsistent with the narrative that can be found in the academic literature and in …nancial letters.
The estimation of the dynamic equation (2), which also controls for euro area APP news, is reported in the …rst two columns of Table 4 . For the sake of saving space, only the coe¢ cients on the error correction mechanism and the APP shock are shown. The results described in Panel A suggest that the error correction mechanism is strongly statistically signi…cant at 1% level with the correct negative sign. Similarly, the adjustment required to reduce the distance between actual and fair sovereign yields is highly statistically signi…cant (see coe¢ cient on E it 1 in the misalignment column). Finally, the APP news has an impact on the dynamics of sovereign yields, which is highly statistically signi…cant regardless of the speci…cation adopted.
[Insert Table 4 , here]
To study the country heterogeneous implications of the APP shock, we interact the APP news with the country …xed e¤ects, namely we estimate (3) . The coe¢ cients reported in Panel B of Table 4 are all negative, highly statistically signi…cant and highly heterogeneous with the lowest value for German and Dutch sovereign yields and the largest value for Italian and Portuguese rates, in line with the …ndings for the US and the UK, where the impact is found to be larger for riskier and more illiquid assets.
The economic implications of these results are summarised in Figure 4 for the euro area as a whole and in Table 5 for the individual countries.
We compute the static ‡ow e¤ect on sovereign yields and its dynamic e¤ect, which takes into account the decay from the error correction mechanism and the fact that b 4 is not statistically di¤erent from zero. The cumulated static ‡ow e¤ect between t + j and T is simply P T j=0 2i N ews EA t+j . The cumulated dynamic e¤ect, which takes into account the e¤ects of all shocks in each period and the decay after T periods given that 0 < 1 < 1, amounts to P T j=0 (1 1 ) T j 2i N ews EA t+j (see Appendix). 5 Note that as 1 approaches zero, the impact of the APP becomes permanent as with the event study methodology. The decay e¤ect is estimated as
The counterfactual experiment for the euro area showing the actual level of the sovereign yield and its prevailing rate, if the APP would have not been launched, indicate that the e¤ect occurred mostly before the bond purchases started in March 2015 and that the APP e¤ect is persistent because b 1 is relatively small (see Figure 4 ).
[Insert Figure 4 , here]
For the euro area as a whole, we compute three set of values: those labelled "EA " in Table   5 are based on the estimation of the pooled regression (2); the EA simple mean is based on the coe¢ cients obtained interacting the APP news with the country dummies and the estimated impact is the country simple mean; the EA weighted average is based on the same coe¢ cients obtained interacting the APP news with the country dummies, but the country a¤ects are weighted by nominal GDP. The dynamic e¤ect is estimated through both the error correction term and the misalignment.
[Insert Table 5 , here] Focusing on the model with misalignment, between September 2014 and October 2015, the ECB policy reduced the 10-year euro area sovereign yields by 63 basis points when looking at the weighted average and by 69 basis points when looking at the mean, with the largest impact on Portuguese yields (106 basis points) and the lowest impact on Dutch and German yields (38-43 basis points). This implies that the policy a¤ected the term premium given that all the risk free rates declined, as well as credit risk perceived by the market, as the jurisdictions bene…ting most from the monetary policy were those with a worse credit risk outlook.
Most of the impact occurred between September 2014 and February 2015, in line with
the view that investors discounted the implications of the monetary policy, before the actual purchases even started. The actual decline in (the ten countries) GDP weighted 10-year euro area sovereign yields amounted to 77 basis points between September 2014 and February 2015, of which 56 basis points was due to APP-related shocks.
It is also useful to point out that the cumulated decay e¤ect amounted to 23 basis points in the case of misalignment. This implies that the level of yields would have been 23 basis points higher in October 2015 without the dynamic e¤ect (see Figure 4 ).
The results are not very dissimilar from the estimates computed for the QE programmes in the US and the UK, despite the APP was launched during calm …nancial conditions. Most likely, markets have looked at the experience of other central banks in order to anticipate the potential impact of APP purchases.
Conclusions
The quanti…cation of the impact of policy measures on asset prices is often based on the price changes observed over a narrow time window surrounding the policy announcement. The iden-ti…cation of the APP impact for the euro area is more challenging, because the monetary policy announcement in January 2015 was already implicitly communicated to the market in 2014.
Therefore, to identify the APP, Bloomberg news on euro area APP is employed. 
APPENDIX
Using expression (3), under the hypothesis that 4 = 0, the impact of APP shocks are calculated as follows:
After T periods, the cumulated impact can be written as 2i N ews I  II  III  IV  I  II  III 
